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THE FIFTH AMENDMENT'S
TAKINGS CLAUSE: PUBLIC USE AND
PRIVATE USE; UNFORTUNATELY,
THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE
Emily L. Madueno*
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: "nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."' The Supreme Court has incorporated the Takings
Clause through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to apply to the states.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Textually, the Takings Clause imposes two restrictions on the
government's use of eminent domain: just compensation and public
use. Just compensation requires that the government pay the private
owner for the property taken through eminent domain? The public
use restriction circumscribes the very scope of the government's
eminent domain power because the government may only "compel
an individual to forfeit her property for the public's use, but not for
the benefit of another private person."4 The breadth of the definition
* J.D. Candidate, May 2007, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Political Science,
summa cum laude, June 2004, California State University, Northridge. Special thanks to
Professors Gideon Kanner and Allan Ides for their invaluable guidance, and to Mary Adams,
Amy Spencer, Tim Oppelt, and Peter Jordan for their thoughtful suggestions. Most importantly, I
would like to thank my husband, Rafael Madueno, and my parents, Larry and Janice Griffith, for
their undying love and support.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
2. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 497 (2001).
3. Just compensation "prevents the public from loading upon one individual more than his
just share of the burdens of government" because "no one can be called upon to surrender or
sacrifice his whole property... for the good of the community, without receiving a recompence
[sic] in value." Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 497 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(quoting Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893)); Vanhome's
Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (1795).
4. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 497.
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of public use determines the extent of the government's power; a
broader definition of public use expands the government's power to
take private property.
Kelo v. City of New London contains the Supreme Court's most
recent interpretation of public use. The Court's decision in Kelo
generated uproar as if it restructured the Takings Clause.' Kelo did
not actually restructure the Takings Clause,6 but it did expand the
government's power. The Court in Kelo enlarged the already broad
definition of public use by holding that economic development per
se, which does not eliminate public harm, is an acceptable public
purpose.
To protect private property ownership, this Note suggests that
the Court adopt a narrower definition of public use. The proper
scope of a narrow public use definition requires actual use by the
general public or public control of the private use; otherwise, the
public use requirement ceases to restrict any taking. The Court
should not so casually "eliminate liberties expressly enumerated in
the Constitution,"7 as it appeared to do in Kelo.
To begin, Part II of this Note examines five categories and two
theories of public use. Part III reviews public use's history,
reflecting the categories and theories described in Part II. A
discussion of Kelo in Part IV develops the fifth category described in
Part II. The Kelo dissents in Part IV then shift this Note's focus from
analyzing the development of public use jurisprudence to advocating
for a narrower definition of public use. Part V explains the theory
behind a narrower definition of public use, suggests where the Court
ought to draw a line beyond which government may not take, and
describes how advocates may go about effecting change. This Note
concludes in Part VI by reiterating the need for a narrower definition
5. See, e.g., Benjamin Weyl, Activist Tries a Grab for Jurist's Property, L.A. TIMES, June
30, 2005, at A10 (discussing a citizen's response to Kelo that proposed that a New Hampshire
town seize Justice Souter's home through eminent domain to build the "Lost Liberty Hotel").
6. The majority and dissent agree that Kelo followed precedent because it defined public
use as public purpose, as precedent had defined public use. Compare Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479
(majority opinion) ("[The] Court long ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned
property be put into use for the general public." (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S.
229, 244 (1984))), with id. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Today's decision is simply the latest
in a string of our cases construing the Public Use Clause to be a virtual nullity, without the
slightest nod to its original meaning.").
7. Id. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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of public use and highlighting suggestions as to how to narrow the
definition.
II. BACKGROUND: FIVE CATEGORIES AND Two THEORIES
As defined by the Court, public use can be classified into several
categories. These categories include: 1) use by the public through
government use; 2) actual use by the public; 3) transfer to a private
party for actual use by the public; 4) direct public benefit or purpose
without actual use by the public; and 5) indirect public benefit or
purpose (to realize a benefit or purpose in the future) without actual
use by the public.
The categories fit within one of two public use theories: the
actual-use (traditional) theory and the public-benefit (contemporary)
theory. Specifically, categories one and two are consistent with the
actual-use theory, while categories four and five are consistent with
the public-benefit theory. Category three satisfies characteristics of
both the actual-use and public-benefit theories, thus connecting the
first two and last two categories.
Until the mid-twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court
generally maintained a traditional interpretation of public use
consistent with the actual-use theory.8 The actual-use theory requires
that the general public be free to actually use the taken property9
(e.g., highways and railways). These takings might be, in some
cases, the transfer of land from private owner A to a private railway
company B; however, the taking always benefits the public as a
whole by allowing the entire public to use the seized property.
The first category-use by the public through government use-
is actual use of the taken property by the government as the public's
representative, such as an air force base. The second category, actual
use by the public, is just that: the public, as individuals, may actually
use the property. Roads and public parks are examples of the second
category.
8. See infra Part III.A.
9. Nathan Alexander Sales, Classical Republicanism and the Fifth Amendment's "Public
Use" Requirement, 49 DUKE L.J. 339, 345 (1999).
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As early as the 1830s when state governments" began taking
private property for railroads, the third category spurred a departure
from the more traditional public use definitions of categories one and
two." This continued through the early twentieth century with
public utilities. 2 In the third category, the government does not
retain title to the taken property, but instead, transfers it to a private
party who will make the property available for actual use by the
public.
Building on the railroad and public utility cases, the fourth and
fifth public use categories are contemporary definitions of public use
consistent with the public-benefit theory. Under the public-benefit
theory, public use is synonymous with public advantage, 3 where
public advantage means a public benefit or public purpose. Courts
defer to legislatures' definitions of public advantage under the
public-benefit theory. 4
The fourth category focuses on the direct public benefit or
purpose generated by the taking, since there is no actual use of the
property by the public. Category four cases involve a taking to
eliminate some public harm, such as blight, although the taking may
include non-offending property if located within a blighted area. 5
Following closely from the fourth category, the fifth category
also lacks actual use by the public; however, category five differs
slightly through its focus on the taking's indirect public benefit or
purpose. Unlike direct public benefit or purpose, a taking justified
by indirect public benefit or purpose eliminates no harm and
guarantees no public benefit. Public-purpose takings include taking
property for redevelopment or economic development. The taking
includes no offending property. This is the type of taking the
Supreme Court upheld in Kelo.
10. "Governments" refer to state governments only and not the federal government, which
did not begin to use its eminent domain power until the late nineteenth century. Kelo, 545 U.S. at
511-12. The states acted under their own public use limitations rather than the federal Takings
Clause because the Takings Clause did not apply to the states until after ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 512.
11. E.g., Beekman v. Saratoga & Schenectady R.R., 3 Paige Ch. 45 (N.Y. Ch. 1831).
12. E.g., Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Ala. Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30
(1916); see discussion infra Parts III.A.3, III.B-C.
13. Sales, supra note 9, at 347-48.
14. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 514.
15. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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Categories four and five have all but eliminated the public use
requirement from the Takings Clause through their broad definition
of public use and deference to the legislature's decision of what is
"public use." Where categories four and five make public use
synonymous with public advantage, public use becomes all-
encompassing. The Court's broad definition eviscerates the
distinction between public and non-public uses by creating a broad
range of private uses that are said to qualify as public without
requiring any actual use or control by the public.
The next section explores how the Court gradually eviscerated
the distinction between public and non-public uses as it developed
the case law of public use under categories one through four existing
before Kelo.
III. LAYING THE FOUNDATION: DEVELOPMENT OF
PUBLIC USE REQUIREMENT JURISPRUDENCE LEADING
TO THE COURT'S CURRENT POSITION ON PUBLIC USE
Public use jurisprudence before Kelo spanned four categories
and included both theories. This section first follows the
development of public use under the actual-use theory, as it describes
categories one through three. The railroad and public utility cases
shift this section's focus to the public-benefit theory. This section
concludes with the development of public use through 2005 under
the public-benefit theory, with discussions of Berman v. Parker and
Berman's progeny.
A. The Actual-Use Theory
The actual-use theory requires that the government or general
public actually use the taken property 6 (e.g., military installations,
highways, railways, and public utilities). Categories one, two, and
three of public use fall under the actual-use theory. Next this Note
describes categories one, two, and three in detail and explains the
characteristics of the actual-use theory.
1. Category One: The Fort
At its narrowest (category one), the actual-use theory only
includes "direct use by the government itself through its officers, and
16. See Sales, supra note 9, at 345-46.
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for the purposes of the government as a political being-as in cases
of... the taking of lands for forts, light-houses, [and] dock-yards."' 7
Under this form of actual use, the public uses the property through
government ownership in the name of the public. In these cases, the
government retains ownership and uses the taken property in the
name of the general public, while the general public as individuals
may not be allowed to use the military installation. 8
In the first category, the taking does not involve actual use by
the general public because private citizens cannot physically access
the property. The fact that the general public cannot physically
access the taken property, however, does not make its use any less
public. If for example, the government owns an air force -base in the
name of the public, which provides the public with national defense,
then the government retains ownership and does not transfer the
taken property to a private party who will provide the public benefit.
This is unlike typical public-benefit takings. The public actually
uses the taken property through its representatives acting in the name
of the people.
2. Category Two: The Road
Second, actual use includes property taken and held by the
government for actual use by the general public. Public roads are an
example of category two. The government retains ownership of the
road in the name of the general public, but unlike the first category of
public use, individual members of the general public may actually
use the road. 9
Together, the first and second categories of public use delineate
the actual-use theory as the crucial characteristic of public ownership
without any transfer to a private party. For example, in one of the
earliest applications of the actual-use theory, a New York court
upheld part of a taking that would be put to public use as a street
17. Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R., 18 Wend. 9, 59 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837) (Tracy,
Sen., concurring). "The Court for the Correction of Errors, New York's highest tribunal at the
time, was 'a complicated amalgam of the state's Chancellor, the Justices of the Supreme Court,
and the 32 members of the state senate."' Sales, supra note 9, at 347 n.32 (quoting Paul
Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 605, 625 n.100 (1993)).
18. See Bloodgood, 18 Wend. at 59.
19. See id. at 59-60.
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while rejecting part of the taking that would be put to private use.2°
In construing the public-use requirement, the court explained that
"[t]he Constitution, by authorizing the appropriation of private
property to public use, impliedly declares, that, for any other use,
private property shall not be taken from one and applied to the
private use of another."21  Then railroads arose, however, and
expanded the definition of public use with the introduction of the
public-benefit theory.
3. Category Three: The Railroad and the Power Plant
The third category of public use developed during the nineteenth
century's period of extraordinary economic growth as a means of
fostering transportation and industrialization.22  This category
represents actual use at its broadest because the government does not
retain ownership of the taken property. Instead, the government
takes private property and transfers it to another private party who
will make it available for use by the general public. Alternatively,
when authorized by statute, a private party may take the property
directly without the government acting as a middleman.23 Railroads
and public utilities are examples of category-three takings. The
private railroad company is the owner and primary user of the taken
property. The public, however, retains the right to use the taken
property by riding a train run by the railroad or by transporting goods
via the railroad, which acts as a common carrier.
B. The Railroad and Public Utility Cases:
The Actual- Use-Public-Benefit Connection
Although the railroad and public utility cases fit into the actual-
use theory, they weaken the actual-use theory and signal a pivotal
point in public-use jurisprudence. Category three extends the first
two categories of public use because apart from any public use, these
uses also confer a substantial private monetary benefit. The private-
20. See In re Albany St., 11 Wend. 149, 151-52 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834). The New York Court
construed the public use requirement in its own constitution, which contained text identical to the
public use requirement in the federal Constitution. Sales, supra note 9, at 339 n.3.
21. Albany St., 11 Wend. at 151.
22. See Laura Mansnerus, Note, Public Use, Private Use, and Judicial Review in Eminent
Domain, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 409, 413 (1983).
23. See, e.g., Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 370 (1905); Linggi v. Garovotti, 286 P.2d 15
(Cal. 1955).
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party transfer is justified under the actual-use theory because though
the private party may benefit, it will make the property available for
actual use by the general public. However, the public cannot use all
of the taken property now owned by the private party.1
4
The railroad and public utility cases also fall under the public-
benefit theory. The private party provides the public a benefit
through the private party's ownership. The public accepts this
tradeoff because the private party can maximize the benefits derived
from the property for the public, which public ownership could not
accomplish as efficiently or, perhaps, at all.
As early as 183 1, in Beekman v. Saratoga and Schenectady R.R.,
New York's highest court of equity held that the New York
Constitution's public use provision allowed government to transfer
the private property of A to private railroad company B for the
purpose of B building railroad lines.25 The public would actually use
the property through the railroad company's services; however, the
court specifically focused on the railroad as a public improvement
providing the public a benefit.26
In this case the court explicitly acknowledged the soundness of a
transfer of property to a private party to produce public benefit. 7
The court also deferred to the legislature to determine whether the
public benefit derived was sufficient to justify taking an individual's
private property.2" Although early in the development of public use,
for a court to depart from actual-use categories, the court cautiously
made clear "[t]he right of eminent domain does not... imply a right
in the sovereign power to take the property of one citizen and
transfer it to another ... where the public interest will be in no way
promoted by such transfer."29
24. For example, railroad tracks, yards, and maintenance facilities are fenced in and usually
have signs posted indicating private property and warning trespassers away.
25. See Beekman v. Saratoga & Schenectady R.R., 3 Paige Ch. 45, 71-72 (N.Y. Ch. 1831).
The New York court construed the public use requirement in its own constitution, which
contained text identical to the public use requirement in the federal Constitution. Compare N.Y.
CONST. of 1821, art. 7, § 7, with U.S. CONST. amend. V.
26. Beekman, 3 Paige Ch. at 73-75.
27. See id.
28. Id. at 73.
29. Id.
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C. Switching Tracks: The Public-Benefit Theory
In the early to mid-twentieth century, the actual-use theory
weakened further as it gave way to the public-benefit theory." The
public-benefit theory gained strength due to the Court's focus on the
public benefit derived from the taken property instead of the
property's actual use.3  However, public use often retained the
actual-use theory's principles of universality and equality of access,
though the principles applied to benefit rather than access.32 The
railroad or public utility of category three provides a public benefit
(through public improvement, transportation, and services), which
only partially justifies category three takings. Category four and five
takings create public benefits (through blight removal and economic
development), and the resulting public benefit solely justifies
category four and five takings.
An actual-use-theory taking might transfer property from private
owner A to a private railway company B; however, the taking always
benefits the public as a whole by allowing a taking only if the entire
public can actually use the seized property. The difference between
actual use and public benefit is a fine line because all actual uses are
public benefits. The difficulty lies in determining public benefits
that qualify as actual uses by the public.
In Mt. Vernon- Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama
Interstate Power Co., for example, the Court upheld the taking of
private property by a state-licensed power company, authorized by
the state to exercise its power of eminent domain, to build a power
plant.33 The company would build a power plant on the taken land
and, with that plant, produce power for public consumption. Private
citizens of the general public could not actually use the Cotton Duck
power plant in the way the public uses a road; however, the general
public actually used and benefited from the power plant. The public
used the plant (through the utility company) to provide itself power.34
30. See Mansnerus, supra note 22, at 413.
31. See id.
32. Sales, supra note 9, at 346.
33. 240 U.S. 30, 32 (1916).
34. See id. ("[T]o gather the streams from waste and to draw from them energy.., and so to
save mankind from toil that it can be spared, is to supply what, next to intellect, is the very
foundation of all our achievements and all our welfare. If that is not public we should be at a loss
to say what is.").
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Although Cotton Duck is a category three case justified by
actual use and public benefit, the Cotton Duck Court heralded the
end of the actual-use theory when it explicitly proclaimed that "[t]he
inadequacy of use by the general public as a universal test is
established."35
D. A New Definition for Public Use: Berman v. Parker
and the Beginning of the Public-Benefit Theory in 1954
The public-benefit theory represents an expansion of public use,
beyond that of the railroad cases because it only requires a benefit to
some portion of the public instead of actual use by the public, or
even a benefit to the general public at large.36 Public use merely
requires that some portion of the public be a clear beneficiary of the
taking.37 Expansion of public use, along with greater deference for
legislative bodies, gained strength through the demise of economic
substantive due process in the 1930s and 1940s3H and the drive for
urban renewal of the 1940s and 1950s. 39 However, the public-benefit
theory actually emerged with the railroad cases. The railroad and
public utility cases serve as the crossties between the actual-use
theory and the public-benefit theory.4" Through its category three
precedent, the Court laid down track to the public-benefit theory and
in 1954 the Court drove in the golden spike with Berman v. Parker
and Berman's progeny, including Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff and Ruckelshaus v. Mansanto Co.
1. Berman v. Parker Removed Blight and More
Berman and its progeny represent category four. Category four
arises when private property is taken and the public no longer
35. Id.
36. Sales, supra note 9, at 347 (citing Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in
Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REv. 203, 205 (1978)).
37. Steven E. Buckingham, Comment, The Kelo Threshold: Private Property and Public
Use Reconsidered, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1279, 1298 (2005) (discussing Mt. Vernon-Woodberry
Cotton Duck Co. v. Ala. Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30 (1916)).
38. The demise of economic substantive due process parallels the concurrent expansion of
public use. Both involve the Court showing greater deference to legislative bodies and retracting
economic liberties (i.e., freedom of contract and protection of private property interests).
Compare W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), with Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26 (1954).
39. Mansnerus, supra note 22, at 415.
40. See supra Parts III.A.3, III.B-C.
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actually uses the property. Instead, a direct public benefit or purpose
satisfies the public-use requirement for the taking. Under category
four, judicial review of the public use also declines. Through
Berman, the Court expanded the scope of public use (to the fourth
category) while at the same time contracting the scope of judicial
review of public use.
In Berman the Court dealt with a plan for the District of
Columbia designed to transform a blighted neighborhood.4"
However, the taking at issue included non-blighted property
(plaintiffs store) within the blighted neighborhood.42 The Berman
Court upheld the taking of plaintiffs non-blighted store based on a
valid public use: a direct public benefit of removing blight from a
neighborhood.43 The Court also found that the taking of plaintiffs
non-blighted store was rationally related to the valid public purpose
of blight removal." To support its specified direct public purpose,
Congress found that "conditions existing in the District of Columbia
with respect to substandard housing and blighted areas, including the
use of buildings in alleys as dwellings for human habitation, are
injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare . .. .""
Berman equated the government's power of eminent domain
with the police power-the government's traditionally-held ill-
defined power to act for the public health, safety, welfare, and
morals.46 Where public use is coterminous with the police power, the
Court grants government incredible power to take private property:
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the
right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is
clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely the
means to the end .... Once the object is within the
authority of Congress, the means by which it will be
attained is also for Congress to determine.47
41. Berman, 348 U.S. at 29.
42. Id. at 31.
43. See id. at 36.
44. See id. at 33-35.
45. Id. at 28.
46. See id. at 32 ("We deal.., with what traditionally has been known as the police
power.").
47. Id. at 33 (citations omitted).
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Therefore, the only question before the Court was whether the
government exercised eminent domain within the scope of its police
power.48
Arguably, all governmental action is designed to serve some
public purpose. Therefore, the Court's focus in eminent domain
cases during the category four period is on the level of scrutiny
applied to determine whether the condemnor acted within its
constitutional scope of power.49 When the Court defined public use
according to the scope of the legislature's police powers, it implicitly
granted the legislature enormous power to establish public use
through an identifiable direct public purpose. However, the Berman
Court went further. In Berman, the Court explicitly proclaimed its
deference to legislatures and reserved for itself minimal reviewing
power:
Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the
legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared
in terms well-nigh conclusive .... [T]he legislature, not the
judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be
served by social legislation .... The role of the judiciary in
determining whether that power is being exercised for a
public purpose is an extremely narrow one."
The Court followed its "deference to the legislature" mantra
when it upheld the taking of plaintiffs store. The store was not itself
blighted though it existed within the blighted neighborhood." The
Court nonetheless concluded that plaintiffs non-blighted store posed
no barrier to a taking because "[o]nce the question of the public
purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be
taken for the project and the need for a particular tract to complete
the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.""2
After Berman, public use no longer requires government
ownership of the taken property (a military installation), direct actual
use by the public (a public road), or indirect actual use by the public
(a railroad or power plant). Under the category four and Berman,
public use merely requires a direct public benefit (blight removal).
48. See id. at 32-33.
49. See Sales, supra note 9, at 348.
50. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32 (citations omitted).
51. Id. at 31.
52. Id. at 35-36.
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2. Berman's Progeny
Thirty years after Berman, the Court affirmed its holding in two
cases-Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff and Ruckelshaus v.
Mansanto Co.-and added to the definition of public use two more
acceptable direct public purposes. 3
a. Government's paradise
In Midkiff the Court dealt with an oligopoly of Hawaiian land
ownership. 4  Hawaii enacted legislation empowering itself to
condemn tracts of land to redistribute the land and end the
oligopoly.5 As the Court noted, the Hawaiian legislature pursued
condemnation and redistribution after concluding that "concentrated
land ownership was responsible for skewing the State's residential
fee simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring the public
tranquility and welfare."56 In support of its holding, the Court quoted
from Berman extensively and concluded "[t]he 'public use'
requirement is thus coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's
police powers."57 The Court upheld the taking as within the state's
police power to regulate land oligopoly and its associated evils, as
documented by the legislature. 8
As the Ninth Circuit explained, the Midkiff taking appeared to be
"a naked attempt on the part of the state of Hawaii to take the private
property of A and transfer it to B solely for B's private use and
benefit" because the property was transferred from private party A
directly to private party B without government possession of the
property at any point. 9  In response to the appellate court, the
Supreme Court rejected any requirement that condemned property be
used by the general public.6" The Court made clear that "[i]t is not
essential that the entire community, nor even any considerable
53. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467
U.S. 986 (1984).
54. See Midkiff 467 U.S. at 232. Land ownership consisted of seventy-two private
landowners owning forty-seven percent of Hawaii's land and the government (state and federal)
owning about forty-nine percent. Id.
55. See id. at 233-34.
56. Id. at 232.
57. Id. at 239-40.
58. See id. at 241.
59. Id. at 235 (quoting Midkiffv. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 798 (9th Cir. 1983)).
60. Id. at 244.
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portion,. . . directly enjoy or participate in any improvement in order
[for it] to constitute a public use."'"
b. Eminent domain for enhanced competition
Ruckelshaus involved a federal law allowing the Environmental
Protection Agency to consider data submitted by one pesticide
manufacturer in its application for a license to sell pesticides when
reviewing another manufacturer's license application.6" After
submitting vulnerable data to the EPA, plaintiff pesticide
manufacturer argued that the federal law constituted a taking for
private use of the manufacturer's submitted data.63 Under the federal
law, the government facilitated the transfer of private property
(research data) from private party A to private party B where the
most direct beneficiary was private party B and not the public. 64
Midkiff upheld a direct private-to-private transfer forced by the
government for a direct public purpose.65 The Ruckelshaus Court
echoed Midklff and "rejected the notion that a use is a public use only
if the property taken is put to use for the general public."66 A taking
constitutes a constitutional taking for public use if the taking
possesses "a conceivable public character," which is satisfied where
the legislature finds a public purpose.67 Essentially, in Ruckelshaus
the Court held that increased competition in the pesticide market was
a valid direct public purpose justifying the taking.68
IV. ENTER KELO v. CITY OF NEWLONDON IN 2005:
THE ICING ON THE PUBLIC-BENEFIT THEORY CAKE
Kelo contains the Supreme Court's most recent interpretation of
public use. The Kelo Court expanded the already broad definition of
61. Id. (quoting Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923)).
62. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 992 (1984). The manufacturer's data was
only used where the other manufacturer offered to compensate the first whose data the EPA
considered. Id.
63. Id. at 999.
64. With A's data, B benefited because B did not have to replicate the complex research that
A had performed.
65. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233-34, 241.
66. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1014 (citing Midioff, 467 U.S. at 243-44).
67. See id. at 1014-15.
68. Id. at 1015 (explaining that the data-consideration provision eliminated barriers to entry
into the pesticide market by obviating duplicative, costly research and by streamlining the
application process for licenses to sell pesticides).
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public use to category five when a slim majority held that economic
development qualifies as public use. Public use under Kelo only
requires that the taking be for an indirect public benefit-
redevelopment or economic development. To understand the breadth
of public use under category five, one must understand that nearly all
governmental actions are capable of indirectly benefiting the public;
otherwise, such actions would be irrational and would not withstand
the most limited judicial review.
A direct public benefit (category four), such as blight removal,
differs from an indirect public benefit (category five), such as a
redevelopment plan, because the public reaps the benefit of blight
removal directly by condemning the offending property. On the
other hand, with a redevelopment plan, the public only reaps a
benefit through the effects of redevelopment, assuming they are
realized, and not through the taking itself.
This section discusses Kelo in detail, including its factual
background, the majority's holding that economic development
qualifies as a public use, and the majority's deference to legislatures
and municipal administrators. The Kelo section then transitions this
Note from explanation to advocacy, using the dissents of Justices
O'Connor and Thomas.
A. Factual Background
Several plaintiffs challenged the power of eminent domain
exercised by the city of New London, Connecticut, which threatened
to take plaintiffs' treasured private properties.69 The city never
alleged plaintiffs' properties were blighted or warranted
condemnation. 0  Instead, plaintiffs' properties "were condemned
only because they happen[ed] to be located in the development area"
the city planned to use for urban revitalization.7'
In 1990, a Connecticut agency designated New London a
distressed municipality.72 In response to economically depressed
conditions, New London officials focused on a plan for economic
revitalization to capitalize on the building of Pfizer's new research
facility and reactivated the private New London Development
69. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 475 (2005).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 473.
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Corporation ("NLDC," also a defendant) to assist city officials with
the city's economic development.73 The city authorized NLDC to
purchase property from willing owners and to take property from
unwilling owners through eminent domain in the city's name.74 The
city expected NLDC's economic development plan to create new
jobs, generate higher tax revenue, make New London more
attractive, and create leisure opportunities through a riverwalk with
restaurants and shopping, marinas, a park, and a museum.75
Plaintiffs' challenge requested injunctive relief to prevent the
city from taking their homes.76 Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief
rather than just compensation because plaintiffs wanted to remain in
their homes.77 The request for injunctive relief framed the issue as
whether New London's economic development plan fell within the
meaning of public use.78
B. The Supreme Court Decided
The Kelo majority allowed the takings when it held that
economic development qualifies as a public use under the federal
Constitution. As part of its expansion of the definition of public use,
the majority also expressed its deference to legislatures and
municipal administrators on the question of public use.
1. Economic Development is a Public Use
In a five-to-four decision, a majority of the Court affirmed fifty
years of public use precedent and expanded that precedent when it
included economic development within the meaning of public use.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens began the Court's reasoning
with two well-established takings principles:
[T]he sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole
purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even
though A is paid just compensation .... [I]t is equally clear
that a State may transfer property from one private party to
73. Id. at 473-74.
74. Id. at 475.
75. Id. at 474-75.
76. Kelo v. City of New London, No. 557299, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 789, at *1 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002).
77. Id.
78. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477.
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another if future "use by the pubic" is the purpose of the
taking ....
Justice Stevens found that New London's economic
development plan did not violate the first principle because the city
did not design the plan to benefit a particular private group or
individual under the guise of an asserted public purpose or
otherwise.8 °
The economic development plan seemed to violate the second
principle because the city did not plan to open all of the condemned
land to use by the general public.8' Also, the city did not require
private lessees to make their services available to the general public,
as is the case with common carriers. 2 However, Justice Stevens
solved this problem for New London because he explained that the
Court abandoned requiring a literal, strict and narrow reading of the
second principle of actual use by the general public.83
Although the Court did not require a showing of actual use by
the general public to satisfy the second principle of 'use by the
public,' the Court argued that it still required satisfaction of its
second principle.84 A showing of public purpose can satisfy the
second principle." For the majority, requiring a public purpose was
merely a difference of degree within its 'use by the public' principle
in that when a taking is for a stated public purpose, this is a type of
use by the public.
After identifying and considering the takings principles, the
Court asked whether New London's economic development plan
served a public purpose to determine whether it was a valid public
use.86 Justice Stevens addressed this question by considering how
79. Id. (emphasis added). Justice Stevens used "sole" and cited no authority for these
propositions. Compare his language to the language Justice O'Connor relied on from Justice
Chase, where "sole" was absent. This indicates that for the dissent, if any of the sovereign's
purposes is to transfer property of A to a private party B, then that runs afoul of the public use
requirement. See infra text accompanying notes 102-06.
80. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477-78.
81. Id. at478.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 479.
84. See id. at 477-80.
85. Id. at 480.
86. Id.
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the Court defined public purpose and looked to Berman, Midkiff, and
Ruckelshaus for guidance. 7
By comparing precedent, Justice Stevens found that New
London's plan served the valid public purpose of economic
development, including new jobs and increased tax revenues."
Justice Stevens emphasized that the Court could not distinguish
economic development from the way that the Court defined public
use in its precedent because the Court maintained a broad
understanding of public use.89 Though finding a public purpose of
economic development where no blight existed goes beyond the
Court's holding in Berman, Justice Stevens framed Berman's
holding in a way that tends to lessen the distinction between Berman
and Kelo discussed by the dissent.9"
Justice Stevens explained that Berman's public use was more
than removing blight-the public use the Court recognized in
Berman was the transformation of a neighborhood through
redevelopment.9 For Justice Stevens, the Berman Court focused on
the improvements made by the city through the taking.92 The valid
public use in Berman seemed to be improvement for improvement's
sake. The majority construed precedent with a focus on
improvements made by the city through the taking to address the
dissent because Kelo only involved improvement for improvement's
sake as New London was not addressing problematic properties by
taking plaintiffs' non-blighted homes and businesses. As
improvement for improvement's sake, Kelo's economic development
for a portion of New London was comparable to Berman's
redevelopment of a neighborhood because both focused on
improvement of an area.
The majority also focused heavily on Kelo's facts-a distressed
municipality that suffered years of economic decline and an
unemployment rate nearly double that of the state.93 The majority
87. Id. at 480-83. See generally discussion supra Part III.D (discussing Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26 (1954), Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984), and Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984)).
88. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483-84.
89. Id. at 484-85.
90. See infra text accompanying notes 109-13.
91. Kelo, 545 U.S. at484 &n.13.
92. See id. at 484 n.13.
93. Id. at 473.
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did so to make its comparison to precedent tighter and to rebut
Justice O'Connor's distinction in dissent between removing blight
and removing perfectly fine homes.94
Even without Justice Steven's crafted description of Berman,
Berman provided the Kelo majority with some support. The owner's
taken property in Berman was not blighted just as the Kelo plaintiffs'
taken properties were not. Technically, that brought Kelo directly in
line with Berman. Berman already provided the reasoning to support
the rule that allowed the city to take non-blighted property: for the
city's redevelopment plan to be effective, the city had to be able to
take an entire blighted area as a whole, not on a piecemeal basis,
including a piece that was not itself blighted.95 Berman's reasoning
may support a taking of non-blighted property located within a
blighted area; however, arguably it does not really support a taking
of non-blighted property located within an area completely lacking
blight.
Regardless of the argument that Berman's reasoning does not
support the taking of non-blighted property located within an area
completely lacking blight, if the city's redevelopment plan required
it, the Court will not question municipal authorities.
2. Legislatures (and Municipal Administrators) Reign Supreme
After finding that the takings by New London served a valid
public purpose, the Court followed its precedent and applied
reasonable relationship review to test New London's power to take
plaintiffs' private properties.96 Justice Stevens rejected the stricter
reasonable certainty test, which required the Court to be reasonably
certain that the anticipated public benefit would actually result from
the taking.97
Under the reasonable relationship test, the majority stated that
the government had the power to take pursuant to a public purpose
"[w]hen the legislature's purpose [was] legitimate and its means
[were] not irrational . . . ."" Justice Stevens justified the reasonable
94. See infra text accompanying note 113.
95. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954).
96. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487-89 (discussing Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229
(1984); Berman, 348 U.S. 26).
97. Id. at 487-88.
98. Id. at 488 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242).
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relationship test by the reasoning that the Court should not second-
guess a legislature's decisions about development plans because
unlike legislative bodies, courts are institutionally limited in making
decisions on matters such as the land needed for a development
project and the efficacy of the project.99
A practical problem with the reasonable certainty test was that it
required the legal rights of all parties to be established through
judicial approval of the plan before the city could implement the
development plan.' 0 However, judicial approval of the plan, based
on a finding that the expected results are reasonably certain to occur,
will almost never be met, and the plan will not be commenced
because it lacks judicial approval.''
Unlike the majority, the dissents support a greater role for courts
in reviewing takings cases.
C. A Unified Dissent of Four Suggests That There Is a
Real Debate Still to Be Had on the Meaning of Public Use
Both Justice O'Connor and Justice Thomas dissented, arguing
that economic development alone is not public use and that courts
should have a more active role in reviewing takings. While Justice
O'Connor's dissent focused on distinguishing Kelo and the Court's
precedent, Justice Thomas's dissent called for a complete overhaul of
public use jurisprudence based on the natural meaning of public use.
1. Justice O'Connor Dissented, Joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas
In her dissent joined by three other members of the Court,
Justice O'Connor questioned the majority's holding by focusing on
differences between the Court's precedent and Kelo. Justice
O'Connor then criticized the majority for practically deleting the
Court's role in reviewing takings.
a. Economic development alone is not public use
Justice O'Connor began her dissent with the same takings
principle Justice Stevens chose as his first takings principle, though
stated differently: "[A] law that takes property from A[] and gives it
99. Id. at 488-89 (citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 35-36).
100. See id. at 488.
101. See id.
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to B: It is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a
Legislature with such powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed
that they have done it."'0 2  The dissent found New London's
economic development plan violated this principle in light of the
Court's precedent and charged the majority with violating the
Takings Clause for holding otherwise. °3 Justice O'Connor clarified
for the majority that the Court's precedent recognized three
categories of takings that comply with the principle shared by the
majority and the dissent:
1) "the sovereign may transfer private property to public
ownership-such as for a road, a hospital, or a military base;'
10 4
2) "the sovereign may transfer private property to private
parties... who make the property available for the public's use-
such as with a railroad, a public utility, or a stadium;"' °5 and
3) the sovereign may take private property to serve a public
purpose even if the property is destined for private ownership, but
only under certain circumstances.'06
The dissent agreed with the majority that Kelo presented a
potential Justice O'Connor-category-three (public purpose) taking,
but the dissent found that the circumstances presented in Kelo were
not the circumstances recognized by two precedents cited by the
majority that allowed valid takings.0 7 The O'Connor dissent did not
suggest overruling the majority's key precedents (Berman and
Midkifj). '08
Justice O'Connor distinguished Kelo's facts from those of
Berman and Midkiff °9 Kelo included no finding of blight or any
other affirmative harm to society through the pre-condemnation
property."0  Both Berman and Midkff involved pre-condemnation
102. Id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Calder v. Bull 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388
(1798) (Chase, J.)).
103. See id. at 494, 497-500.
104. Id. at 497.
105. Id. at 498.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 498-501 (comparing the facts in Kelo to Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26
(1954), and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)).
108. See id. at 498 ("We are guided by two precedents about the taking of real property by
eminent domain.").
109. See id. at 500-01.
110. Id.
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uses that inflicted affirmative harm on society-a blighted
neighborhood (Berman) and a land oligopoly's social and economic
evils (Midklfi).'1 ' The sovereigns in Berman and Midkiff both
realized a direct public benefit through the takings involved by
eliminating the harmful condition posed by the property in its pre-
condemnation state." 2 Eliminating harm to the public seemed to be
the special circumstance Justice O'Connor would require for
category three public purpose takings that she found lacking in Kelo.
None of the taken property in Kelo was harmful: the city condemned
plaintiffs non-offending, well-maintained homes." 3 As a result, the
majority jettisoned the Berman requirement that if the taking is not
for actual use, the taking must eliminate harm.
b. Courts have a role, too
In examining Berman and Midkiff, Justice O'Connor discussed
the role of the courts vis-A-vis legislatures.114 Although deference to
the legislature and municipal administrators on the meaning of public
purpose is important, Justice O'Connor emphasized that the Court
must maintain a role, as both Berman and Midkiff held.'15 That
courts should have a role is not to say that courts should distrust
legislatures or municipal administrators to determine public purposes
simply because they will always find a purported public purpose to
justify any action they may pursue.1 6 Rather, Justice O'Connor
expressed the dissent's concern that a judicial check is necessary in
the interpretation of public use if public use is to retain any meaning
as a limitation on government's power.17 To square the judicial
check for the courts with seemingly contradictory statements
regarding the police power the Court made in Berman and Midkiff,
111. Id. at 500.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 500-01.
114. See id. at 499-500.
115. Id. at 500.
116. Municipal administrators are often corrupt, or at best, show favoritism toward their
friends. See Patrick McGreevy, Audit Targets Redevelopment Agency, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29,
2006, at B4; see, e.g., Sw. Ill. Dev. Auth. (SWIDA) v. Nat'l City Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1, 10
(Ill. 2002) ("SWIDA advertised that, for a fee, it would condemn land at the request of 'private
developers' for the 'private use' of developers.... SWIDA entered into a contract with Gateway
to condemn whatever land 'may be desired.., by Gateway.' ... It appears SWIDA's true
intentions were to act as a default broker of land for Gateway's proposed parking plan.").
117. Kelo, 545 U.S. at497.
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Justice O'Connor designated the police power language in Berman
and Midklff as errant and unnecessary dicta."8 The police power and
the power of eminent domain are quite distinct: the former is
regulatory and the latter is acquisitory.
While Justice O'Connor advocates for a judicial check on
political discretion, she fails to elaborate on the extent of the Court's
role. Plaintiffs presented the argument that the Court ought to adopt
the reasonable certainty test,' which Justice O'Connor should have
addressed so the dissent could have avoided criticizing the majority
without offering a viable alternative.
2. Justice Thomas Dissented
a. Economic development alone is not public use
Though Justice Thomas joined Justice O'Connor's subtler
dissent distinguishing Kelo's facts from precedent relied on by the
majority, Justice Thomas dissented separately waging an open attack
on that precedent. His attack criticized precedent and the majority in
following that precedent for their departure from the original and
natural reading of the Takings Clause's public use requirement. 2 °
Justice Thomas focused on the constitutional text of 'public use.'
The text of the Takings Clause states "public use" and not public
purpose;12' however, according to Justice Thomas, the majority's
reasoning, "replace[d] the Public Use Clause with a '[P]ublic
[P]urpose' Clause... or perhaps the 'Diverse and Always Evolving
Needs of Society' Clause."' 2 2  Imbuing public use with a public
purpose meaning rendered public use meaningless because public
purpose served no other function than to state that the government
may take property for public or private uses through eminent
domain.12 1 If public use means public purpose, public use in the
118. Id. at 501 ("We deal ... with what traditionally has been known as the police power."
(quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954))); id. ("The 'public use' requirement is
coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers." (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984))).
119. Id. at 487 (majority opinion).
120. See id. at 505-06 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
121. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
122. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 506 (citation omitted).
123. Id. at 507. If public use means public and private use, which are the only two
possibilities of uses for which property may be taken, there would be no need to include 'public'
in the Constitution's text. On the other hand, Justice Thomas is clear to explain that interpreting
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Takings Clause replicates the inquiry appropriate under the
Necessary and Proper Clause-whether the taking serves a valid
public purpose.'24 Accordingly, defining public use by public
purpose renders "public use" surplusage.'25  Justice Thomas
explained that a constitutional interpretation rendering constitutional
text surplus is unacceptable.'26
Instead, Justice Thomas advocated a natural reading of public
use, based on a definition of 'use' as employ, which allowed
government takings for government ownership or for private
ownership where the public would have a legal right to use the taken
property.'27 He reasoned that where the government transferred
property from private party A to private party B, with possession by
B, the public cannot be said to have any right to use the property.
128
The public did not have any right to the property despite incidental
benefits the public enjoyed because the public cannot be said to be
employing the property.
29
Justice Thomas's reasoning based on the meaning of "use" as
"employ" demonstrates the pivotal role of the category three railroad
cases. Although the railroad cases involved government transfer of
property from private party A to private railroad B, the possession by
B involved both public benefit from the property and public
employment of the property. The public can be said to be employing
the property where it is owned by the railroad in that all members of
the public can use the property as a railroad for transporting
themselves or chattels.
public use only as public and not as private use does not mean that the Takings Clause
distinguishes between those takings that require that the condemnor pay just compensation from
those that do not require such payment. Id. To use the Takings Clause to distinguish between
compensated and non-compensated takings would violate a bedrock principle well-established at
the founding of the United States: all takings require that the condemnor pay compensation. Id.
at 507-08 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *134-35; JAMES KENT, 2
COMMENTARIES *275; JAMES MADISON, For the National Property Gazette (Mar. 27, 1792), in
14 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266, 267 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983)).
124. Id. at 511. The Necessary and Proper Clause grants the government power to take to
serve a public purpose, but at the same time, the Takings Clause limits the government's
acquisition power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to takings for use by the public. See id.
125. Id. at507,511.
126. Id. at 507 ("It cannot be presumed that any clause in the [C]onstitution is intended to be
without effect." (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803))).
127. See id. at 508-09.
128. See id. at 508.
129. Id.
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Justice Thomas may be right about public purpose exceeding the
meaning of public use if 'use' indeed means employ. However, why
confine use to its narrow definition of employ rather than a broader
definition such as convenience? To justify his limitation on 'use' to
employ, Justice Thomas considered other occurrences of 'use' in the
Constitution 3 ' and compared 'public use' to 'general welfare."'"
Despite Justice Thomas's logic that the Framers would have
used broader language in the Takings Clause if they had meant
something as sweeping as general welfare, the majority imbued
public use with a sweeping meaning by equating public use (the
scope of the power of eminent domain) with the police power.'
Justice Thomas denounced equating the power of eminent domain
with the police power based on history of the two powers. Exercise
of the police power typically required no compensation, whereas
exercise of the power of eminent domain has always required the
payment of compensation.133 For example, Justice Thomas criticized
the Berman Court because it unnecessarily expanded public use to
mean public purpose to allow the legislature to deal with a blighted
neighborhood.'34 According to Justice Thomas, the Berman Court
did not need to expand public use to mean public purpose because
state nuisance law through the state's police power provided an
appropriate remedy to address a blighted neighborhood.'35
b. Courts have a role, too
Of all the provisions in the Bill of Rights, Justice Thomas
wondered why the Court singled out public use to abdicate its duty to
130. Justice Thomas considered the occurrences of 'use' in Article I, § 8 and Article I, § 10,
both of which employ 'use' in the narrower sense. Id. at 509; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12
("Congress shall have the power... [t]o raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of
Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years."); id art. I, § 10, cl. 2 ("[Tlhe net
Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of
the Treasury of the United States.").
13 1. Justice Thomas concluded that if the Framers wanted public use to mean something as
broad as 'general welfare,' the Framers would have used such language for expressing that
broader idea in place of 'public use.' Kelo, 545 U.S. at 509.
132. Seeid. at519.
133. Id. at 519 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *134-35; JAMES KENT, 2
COMMENTARIES *275; JAMES MADISON, For the National Property Gazette (Mar. 27, 1792), in
14 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266, 267 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983)).
134. See id. at 519-20
135. Id.
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say what the law is.' 36 The Court, for example, did not defer to any
legislative determination of what constitutes a reasonable search of a
home.'37  Justice Thomas observed that under the Court's
jurisprudence, "citizens are safe from the government in their homes,
the homes themselves are not."'38 Justice Thomas further questioned
why, if the Court did not defer to legislative judgment when the
government only wanted to search a home, which the Court
considered sacrosanct, the Court deferred to the legislative judgment
when the government wanted to seize the home and tear it down.'39
To relieve Justice Thomas of his concern for how "seriously
awry" the Court's interpretation of the Constitution has gone,
40
courts ought not abdicate their responsibility to determine what
public use means, deferring entirely to the judgment of legislative
bodies. In addition, when exercising their responsibility, courts
should define public use more narrowly.
V. WHAT SHOULD PUBLIC USE MEAN?
Law and practice should follow theory. This section begins by
explaining the theory behind a more narrow definition of public use.
The section next describes the narrower definition of public use and
states what it does and does not include. Finally, this section
explores possible ways to bring about a narrower definition of public
use, which include ratifying a constitutional amendment, persuading
a majority of the Court to change its mind, and lobbying
representative government.
A. Theory (The Why)
The Court ought to protect property rights because the
Constitution contains several provisions for that very purpose. The
Framers deemed property so important that they listed property with
life and liberty in the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause."'
Property appears again in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
136. See id. at 517-18.
137. Id. at 518 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980)).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ... ").
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Clause. 42  The Takings Clause was the first provision of the Bill of
Rights that the Court incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendment.'43 Given the many protections the Constitution extends
to property rights, it follows that courts should protect property rights
to a higher degree than they currently do.'44
Soon after the Fifth Amendment's ratification in 1795, Justice
Patterson characterized eminent domain as the "despotic power,"
though necessary at times.'45 He further explained that "the right of
acquiring and possessing property, and having it protected, is one of
the natural, inherent, and unalienable rights of man."' 46
The right to own, use, and freely dispose of one's property is an
inalienable right of man.4 7  The state does not grant property as a
privilege; rather, property "is a right that exists apart from society
and, indeed, exists before society."' 48 The only justification for any
limitation of private property rights, as with liberty, is the voluntary
combination of people to form a government for the sake of
protecting as much of those liberty interests as possible. Men agree
to this social contract, government, because it is designed to
safeguard their liberty and property against all others."' Our social
contract is the Constitution.
When the Framers designed our government they provided for
property's protection vis-&-vis government power in several ways,
142. Id. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... ").
143. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 497.
144. For a review of the shameful degree of protection the Court currently extends to property
rights, see Gideon Kanner, "[Un]equal Justice Under Law": The Invidiously Disparate
Treatment of American Property Owners in Taking Cases, 41 LoY. L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming
2008).
145. Vanhome's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 311 (1795).
146. Id. at 310 (emphasis added).
147. Id.; see also City of Norwood v. Homey, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853
N.E.2d 1115, at 35 ("To be... protected and... secure in the possession of [one's] property is
a right inalienable, a right which a written constitution may recognize or declare, but which
existed independently of and before such recognition, and which no government can destroy."
(quoting Henry v. Dubuque Pac. R.R., 10 Iowa 540, 544 (1860))); Ayn Rand, Man's Rights, in
THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS 108, 110 (1964) ("The right to life is the source of all rights-and
the right to property is their only implementation. Without property rights, no other rights are
possible. Since man has to sustain his life by his own effort, the man who has no right to the
product of his effort has no means to sustain his life.").
148. Buckingham, supra note 37, at 1294.
149. "Government is instituted no less for protection of the property than of the persons of
individuals." THE FEDERALIST NO. 54, at 307 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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including through the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 5 °
The Takings Clause limits the government's power of eminent
domain and protects "'the security of Property,"' which Alexander
Hamilton described to the Philadelphia Convention as one of the
'great ob[jects] of Gov[emment]."""' Through this clause, the
Framers struck a balance between the individual's desire to form a
government for the protection of his property and the powers of that
government to sustain itself for its instituted purpose.'52
As with other liberty interests, property interests cannot be
absolute no matter how vital to man's survival. An individual's
liberty may be limited by joining together to form government for
the sake of mutual benefit to all individuals. Similarly, a man's
property interest may be limited. Public use in the Constitution
defined the extent of that limitation on man's property interest.
Soon after ratification of the Fifth Amendment, Justice Chase
identified the natural interpretation of public use.'53 Departure from
the natural interpretation of public use leads down a slippery slope.
Where public use is defined as public benefit and public purpose, and
where public use is deemed coterminous with the police power, is
there any limit on the government's power to take? There is nothing
to stop the legislature from taking A's private property and giving it
to B, in violation of the natural interpretation of public use, where B
could make better use of it and provide a greater benefit to the
public. Nothing limits the legislature's power to take when the Court
has determined public benefit justifies the taking of private
property.
154
The Court has refused to limit the legislature's power in another
way. Whether a taking actually provides a public benefit does not
matter when the Court abdicates its responsibility and allows the
legislature to define its own powers. 5  The Berman Court provides
150. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
151. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 496 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(alteration in original) (quoting 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 302 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911)).
152. Whether the Constitution struck the correct balance, it is the balance Americans use until
and unless Americans amend it.
153. See supra note 102.
154. See Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R., 18 Wend. 9, 61-62 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837)
(Tracy, Sen., concurring).
155. See id.
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an example of its abdication when it declared: "Subject to specific
constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public
interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive."'56 With
that statement, the Berman Court explicitly proclaimed its deference
to legislatures and reserved for itself minimal power to review
challenges under the Takings Clause.5 7  Isn't the public use
requirement in the Takings Clause such a "specific constitutional
limitation"?
When courts allow legislatures to define their own powers,
courts betray the Framers' carefully crafted system of government
and abandon the Constitution because they thrust the legislature over
the Constitution.
[T]o insist that the determination or expression by the
Legislature that it is for the public interest and expedient in
a particular case to exert the right of eminent domain, or the
power of sovereignty, ipso facto, establishes that the power
of sovereignty is rightfully exerted, is in effect to insist that
the power of the Legislature is above the power of the
Constitution .... [H]appily for us... the Legislature is not
the creator or judge of its own powers; but is the creature of
the Constitution, and all its acts must be in subordination to
it.
58
When the Court departs from our constitutional framework, the
result is egregious violation of property rights expressly stated in the
Constitution. Government becomes the tool of business. The
highest bidder wins the legislature's favor. For example, after Kelo,
private homes have been taken for shopping malls and small-scale
businesses have been confiscated for more upscale businesses."'
The Court's current definition of public use makes all private
property vulnerable to eminent domain because another private entity
can always claim to make "better" use of the property.
To stop this attack on private property ownership, public use
ought to possess a more narrow meaning and courts, including the
156. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,32 (1954).
157. Id.
158. Bloodgood, 18 Wend. at 63.
159. Petition for Rehearing at 2, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-
108); e.g., id. at 2-7.
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Supreme Court, ought to enforce that narrower meaning by
performing more than a cursory review of takings.
B. Law (The What)
Limiting the scope of public use to the confines of the actual-use
theory protects private property by erecting barriers to the
government's exercise of its eminent domain power. An inherent
tension exists between the individual's inalienable right to possess
property and the state's traditionally-held power to take property in
the name of all individuals. Mindful of that tension, the Framers of
the federal Constitution included two requirements for the
government to exercise eminent domain: 1) the taking must be for
public use and 2) the condemnor must pay just compensation to the
property owner. This Note has demonstrated the deterioration of the
public use requirement and the resulting growth of the government's
power to take. In light of the theory behind eminent domain and
private property rights, this growth is unacceptable.
Man is not a caged prisoner of government, living at the
government's mercy as to what property he may keep; instead, man
ratified the Constitution to cage the necessary beast that is
government so that government may only take man's property on
man's terms. To stop and reverse the growth of the government's
power to take, the public use requirement must have teeth once again
to bite the government's hand when government inappropriately
reaches beyond its limiting cage to take on its terms rather than on
man's terms. Public use must, therefore, assume a more narrow
meaning, and courts, the traditional guardians of constitutional limits
on government, must review government action.
1. Giving Public Use Some Teeth
To reach a more narrow meaning of public use, public use
should not include economic development alone or eliminating harm
to the public. In terms of this Note's categories, this means that
public use should not include category four or category five.
The problem with allowing category four is in defining harm to
the public. A harm-to-the-public threshold imposes a dangerous
subjective standard. Allowing a taking to eliminate harm to the
public softens the public use requirement because legislatures and
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municipal administrators have too much discretion to label things as
harmful to the public.
Additionally, a category four taking to eliminate harm differs
from a taking under categories one through three in an important
way. A taking under the first three categories creates something for
the public benefit where it did not exist before, such as a military
base, road, or railroad. A category four taking based on eliminating
harm to the public destroys a threat to the public well-being, such as
removing blight, yet such a taking does not create anything for the
public in its place. 6
Narrowing public use to categories one through three goes a
long way to enforcing the constitutional limit on government. To
enforce that narrow meaning, courts ought to assume a greater role in
reviewing takings cases.
2. Courts Ought to Bite Back
The American system of government at the federal and state
levels uses a separation of powers theory. The Supreme Court in
Marbury v. Madison proclaimed that "[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,"
establishing for courts the power of judicial review of legislative and
executive actions. 6' In light of the separation of powers theory and
the Supreme Court's own precedent, courts ought to determine
independent of legislatures what qualifies as public use. This means
that courts cannot shirk their responsibility to review proposed
takings by other government actors. If courts fail to exercise judicial
review in eminent domain cases, both limits imposed on eminent
domain and the separation of powers theory fail.
The current standard that the Supreme Court requires for
reviewing whether proposed takings satisfy the public use
requirement is shameful and non-existent. The Court merely
requires that the taking be "rationally related to a conceivable public
purpose."'62 Such a standard transforms courts into rubber stamps
for legislatures and municipal administrators because virtually every
160. See City of Norwood v. Homey, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d
1115, at 57.
161. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
162. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).
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taking possesses a conceivable public purpose.163 At the very
minimum, the Court should require a review of the public use
requirement under the traditional rational basis test."6 If the Court is
unwilling to redefine public use, the Court should at least demand
that the condemnor show that the taking is reasonably certain to
result in certain public benefits.
Limits on government imply that some sort of judicial review
will occur to ensure that government respects those limits. Limited
government means that government may only act where the
Constitution confers power on the government to act, and that the
government has the burden of proving that the Constitution provides
that it may act. Limits also mean that courts should resolve every
doubt in favor of the property owner because the government, being
one of limited power that possesses the burden of proof, must justify
its action to the court's satisfaction. To follow this logic, consider,
for example, a criminal case. In a criminal case, the prosecution
bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty. Every doubt
should be resolved in favor of the defendant because the prosecution,
possessing the burden of proof, must satisfy its burden of proof to the
trier of fact's satisfaction.
Without the courts stepping in to enforce limits on government's
power, the government possesses the unlimited power to redefine
property rights-a power that the Constitution did not grant to the
government.
C. Practice (The How)
1. Convince a Majority on the Court
Precedent offers little insight as to how narrow the justices on
the Supreme Court are willing to interpret public use. Justice
163. For an amusing, yet startlingly actual debate over what is conceivable, see the footnote
containing an oral argument transcript for Alaska Central Express, Inc. v. United States and
accompanying text in Kanner, supra note 144.
164. To satisfy the rational basis test, the government's action must be "rationally related to a
legitimate state interest." City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985). Despite Justice Kennedy's claim that the standard the Kelo majority adopted ("rationally
related to a conceivable public purpose") echoes the rational-basis test, Kelo v. City of New
London, 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring), the standard the majority adopted is
much more deferential because the state interest must merely be "conceivable," and need not be
"legitimate." See supra note 163.
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O'Connor wrote an opinion in Midkff for a unanimous majority,
which included Justice Stevens and the late Chief Justice
Rehnquist.'65 These three justices were willing to define public use
as eliminating public harm (category four), but only Justice Stevens,
who wrote the majority opinion for Kelo, showed himself willing to
extend public use to economic development (category five).'6 6
Neither Chief Justice Rehnquist nor Justice O'Connor are currently
on the Court, and Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito now fill
their seats. The judicial records of the newest justices, however, do
not determinatively indicate where either would draw the public use
line. Justice Kennedy concurred in Kelo, but expressed that even
under a rational-basis review, he would strike down a taking that
intended to benefit "particular, favored private entities" with
"incidental or pretextual public benefits."'67
Although public-use precedent gives little insight into how far
justices are willing to narrow the definition of public use, precedent
admittedly weighs against an actual-use interpretation (categories
one, two, and three) through Berman, Midkiff Ruckelshaus, and
Kelo. To change the course of the Court's jurisprudence when faced
with such adverse precedent, the Court must distinguish its
precedent. The Court must find demonstrated differences between
pending cases and precedent so that the Court can limit its
application of the precedent's holding only to that precedent's facts.
This Note's categories provide a means of determining where
differences lie. The difference between category four with Berman
and category five with Kelo, for example, is that the Berman taking
involved removing harm to the public, whereas the Kelo taking
removed non-offending, non-harmful properties.'68 The difference
between category three with Cotton Duck and category four with
Berman, as another example, is that the category three taking creates
something new for the public benefit (public utility) where it did not
exist before, whereas the category four taking does not.
165. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at231.
166. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 470, 484-85 (majority opinion).
167. Id. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
168. Compare Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28-29 (1954) (describing the taken area as
blighted), with Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475 (majority opinion) ("There is no allegation that any of these
properties is blighted or otherwise in poor condition .... ).
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Distinguishing precedent to narrow the reach of public use
would go a long way towards restoring the Court's jurisprudential
honesty. To be blunt, how can a majority on the Supreme Court
unabashedly refuse to enforce a limitation on government explicit in
the Constitution while having no problem enforcing other limits on
government (termed rights rather than limits) not explicit in the
Constitution?16 9 If the Court is willing to grant protection to personal
liberties, where specific textual limits on government's power is
lacking, why does the Court refuse to grant such protection in
enforcing specific constitutional limits to protect personal liberty
interests in property, such as the public use requirement of the
Takings Clause, that the Founders included for that purpose?
Although this Note has urged the Supreme Court to reconsider
its decision in Kelo and narrow its interpretation of public use,
private property rights are so important that this Note ought to
consider other avenues of protection. Other means of seeking the
protection of private property rights include lobbying federal and
state executive and legislative representatives and qualifying and
voting for ballot initiatives.
2. Lobby Representative Government
or Qualify an Initiative for the Ballot
One need not rely on the Court, waiting for it to narrowly define
public use and grant greater protection under the Takings Clause.
Property owners can lobby federal, state and local elected officials,
Congress, and local legislatures to accommodate themselves. Under
our constitutional system, with the Constitution as the supreme law
of the land, legislatures may not create laws less protective of
individuals (granting the government greater power and infringing on
169. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that a state cannot
criminalize consenting same sex adults for engaging in sodomy in the privacy of their home); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the Due Process Clause affords women the right to
choose whether to have an abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (gathering
penumbras of several rights within the Bill of Rights to explain how the right to privacy exists in
the Constitution). This is not to say that the Court decided these cases incorrectly; this Note
expresses no opinion as to that question. The function of these cases is to demonstrate that asking
the Court to enforce stringent limits on the government is not something new or outrageous. See
Kanner, supra note 144, for the disparate treatment of property owners seeking to have courts
enforce their property rights and other litigants seeking to have courts enforce their personal
rights.
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individual liberties). 70 The Supremacy Clause, however, does not
prevent a legislative body or an executive from providing individuals
greater protection than the Constitution requires. 7' At the federal
level, the President signed an executive order and Congress has
considered legislation to protect private property rights. Further, the
people themselves could protect property rights by ratifying a
constitutional amendment.
a. Federal eminent domain reform
President Bush responded to Kelo with an executive order to
protect private property rights. The president's order allows the
federal government to take private property only for public use and
not to economically benefit private parties receiving the taken
property.' To clarify what the order means by public use, the
president listed several situations where a taking is appropriate,
including: 1) public ownership of the taken property, 2) exclusive
use by the public of the taken property, 3) a project designed for
public transportation, 4) a project designed for a public utility, 5) a
transfer to a common carrier that will make the taken property
available to the public as of right, and 6) a taking to eliminate public
harm.'73  In terms of this Note's categories, President Bush's
executive order permits a taking for categories one through four, but
not for category five.
Within a few days after the Court announced Kelo,
Congressman Sensenbrenner introduced a bill in the House that
attacked the Court's decision.'74 The bill states its purpose on its
face-protecting private property rights. 17 5  The House
overwhelmingly passed the bill in November 2005 and referred the
170. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.").
171. See id.; Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489.
172. Exec. Order No. 13,406, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,973 (June 28, 2006).
173. Id.
174. See Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. (2005).
175. Id. ("To protect private property rights.").
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bill to the Senate.'76 Unfortunately for property owners, the Senate
has not passed the House bill or the Senate counterpart.'
Despite the Court's ruling that economic development is a valid
public use for eminent domain, the House bill explicitly states that
economic development cannot be a valid reason for the sovereign to
exercise eminent domain.'78 The bill defines economic development
as taking private property and conveying or leasing it to a private
entity.'79 Economic development does not include transfers for
public ownership (military base), transfers to an entity that makes the
property available to the general public (railroad or public utility),
transfers for a right of way open to the public (road), or transfers to
remove harmful uses of land (blight removal). 8 ° In terms of this
Note's categories, the House Bill allows the taking of private
property for categories one through four, but not five.
The House bill addresses eminent domain abuse of state
governments and the federal government.8 To limit states, the
House relies on Congress's spending power.'82 If enacted, the bill
would refuse to disburse federal funds to a state using federal funds
for state eminent domain projects premised on economic
development.'83 Enacting the House bill would limit the federal
government by forbidding Congress from using economic
development as a reason to exercise eminent domain.'84 The bill
contains an express private right of action so that private individuals
can petition a court to enforce the bill's protective provisions.'85 The
176. News Advisory, U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary, House
Overwhelmingly Approves Bipartisan Legislation Protecting Private Property Rights (Nov. 3,
2005), http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/takingsHousepass 11305.pdf
177. Press Release, Castle Coal., Senate Fails to Pass Eminent Domain Reform (Dec. 11,
2006), available at http://www.castlecoalition.org/media/releases/12_ l l06pr.html. Senator
James Inhofe introduced Senate Bill 3873 in September 2006. Id. For the text of the bill, see
Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2006, S. 3873, 109th Cong. (2006).
178. H.R. 4128 §§ 2(a), 3. Congress cannot, however, redefine the scope of a constitutional
right as defined by the Supreme Court. Cf City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519, 524
(1997).
179. H.R. 4128 § 8(1).
180. Id.
181. See id. §§ 2-3.
182. See id. § 2(a)-(b).
183. Id.
184. Id. § 3.
185. Id. § 4(a).
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right of action provision also contains a fee provision permitting a
prevailing plaintiff to recover attorney's and other fees.'86
Although federal legislation is more likely to occur than getting
a constitutional amendment ratified, property owners could seek to
ratify a new amendment to the federal Constitution. The
Constitution, however, already contains an amendment on point; this
Note begins by quoting the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Perhaps if that language is included in the Constitution twice the
Court will take the public use limit on government's power of
eminent domain more seriously.
For the newer version of the Takings Clause, however, rather
than sticking with the same language, which a majority of the Kelo
Court either had trouble understanding or fun playing with, add
more. The new Takings Clause could read: "Private property shall
not be taken for public use, without just compensation," and to
borrow from Justice Thomas to be clear, "this is not the '[P]ublic
[P]urpose Clause' and it is definitely not the 'Diverse and Always
Evolving Needs of Society Clause."87 If you are not sure what the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment means, the new Twenty-
Eighth Amendment will tell you.
Given the stringent requirements to amend the Constitution,88 it
is unlikely that this country will ratify a new amendment for this
purpose. However, in addition to these federal options, reform could
occur at the state level. The Kelo majority emphasized that nothing
precludes any state from restricting the government's power of
eminent domain further than the federal baseline.'89
b. Eminent domain reform in the states
Both more convenient and effective than reform on the federal
level, a state may limit government's power of eminent domain and
protect private property rights through the state's constitution or
through state statutes, or both. Several states limited eminent domain
before Kelo and several have in response to Kelo. Some states have
limited eminent domain through language in state constitutions or
statutes nearly identical to the federal Takings Clause. Other states,
186. Id. § 4(c).
187. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 506 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
188. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
189. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489 (majority opinion).
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however, relied on state constitutional or statutory language more
specific than the Takings Clause in the federal Constitution. South
Carolina, Michigan, Oklahoma, Ohio, and Arizona have all defined
public use for themselves and set decent examples for other states.
i. Similar language, different meaning
The takings clauses in the constitutions of both Michigan and
Ohio are nearly identical to the federal Takings Clause.'90 Despite
the textual similarities, the highest courts of both states interpreted
their clauses more narrowly than the Supreme Court interpreted the
federal Takings Clause in Kelo.
Before the U.S. Supreme Court decided Kelo, the high court in
Michigan interpreted its takings clause as it applied to facts very
similar to Kelo. In County of Wayne v. Hathcock, the county wanted
to condemn defendants' non-blighted properties to construct a
business and technology park that would generate millions in tax
revenues and thousands of jobs. 9 ' The Michigan Supreme Court
granted more protection to property rights than the U.S. Supreme
Court later granted in Kelo.
According to the Michigan Supreme Court, public use in the
Michigan constitution does not absolutely bar transferring taken
property to private entities.'92 Public use does, however, absolutely
bar transfers of property to private entities for private use. The court,
therefore, limits transfers to private entities to three situations:'93 1)
where extreme public necessity requires it because the land can only
be assembled by a government; 2) where the private entity receiving
the property remains accountable to the public in its use of the
property; and 3) where the government selects the property it
transfers based on "facts of independent public significance," rather
than on the interests of the private party getting the property."' In
190. Compare MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2 ("Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation .. "), and OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 19 ("[W]here private property shall
be taken for public use, a compensation therefor shall first be made in money .. "), with U.S.
CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation").
191. 684 N.W.2d 765, 770, 784 (Mich. 2004).
192. Id. at 781.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 783 (citing Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 477-80
(Mich. 1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting)); see also id. at 781-83 (explaining in greater depth each
situation where transfer to a private entity is appropriate).
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terms of this Note's categories, the court allows a transfer to a
private entity for 1) a category two road and a category three
railroad, 2) a category three public utility, and 3) a category four
blight removal.
After the U.S. Supreme Court decided Kelo, the Ohio Supreme
Court considered the same issue the U.S. Supreme Court considered
in Kelo-whether a city can take private property for economic
development.'95 Specifically, the city wanted to take private property
that the city determined was within an area not yet blighted, but that
may deteriorate in the future.'96 The Ohio facts resembled Kelo's
facts, including non-blighted private property under attack, a city that
has deteriorated in the last forty years, and a plan to redevelop the
city and increase tax revenues.'97 The Ohio Supreme Court also
considered language similar to the federal Takings Clause, and
though not identical, the Ohio Constitution is no more specific in
limiting the government's power of eminent domain than the federal
Constitution.9
While acknowledging that Ohio precedent allows the
government to take blighted private property for redevelopment, the
Ohio Supreme Court held that the taking of private property for
economic development without blight does not satisfy the public use
requirement in Ohio's Constitution.'99 Like the Michigan court, in
terms of this Note's categories, the Ohio court allows a taking for
some category four purposes, but not for category five purposes.
The court, for example, stated that eliminating a land oligopoly does
not satisfy Ohio's public use requirement,"' yet removing blight
does.2"'
Holding as it did, the Ohio Supreme Court refused to interpret
Ohio's public use clause as broadly as the U.S. Supreme Court
interpreted the federal public use clause because the Ohio Supreme
Court preferred that the clause remain an essential limit on proposed
195. See City of Norwood v. Homey, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d
1115, at 8-9.
196. Id. at 8.
197. Id. at 9, 13-18.
198. See supra note 190.
199. Homey at 8-9, 59, 75, 75 n.12.
200. See id. at 65 (rejecting Midkiff as presenting a novel use of eminent domain law).
201. Id. at 59.
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takings. 2 ' The Ohio Constitution, which contains protections for
private property in addition to the public use requirement,2"3 clearly
influenced the court when it decided not to allow government to
exercise eminent domain unrestrained.2 °
These state cases suggest that the U.S. Supreme Court would not
misinterpret the federal Takings Clause if it adopted a similar
interpretation of public use to limit the government's power of
eminent domain. Michigan's and Ohio's interpretations are valuable
evidence that the federal Takings Clause can be the basis for a
narrow meaning of public use. Other states provide examples of
more specific constitutional and statutory language that suggest ways
of drafting laws more protective of property rights.
ii. More specific language, greater protection
Unlike Michigan and Ohio with constitutional language similar
to the federal Takings Clause, South Carolina, Oklahoma, and
Arizona adopted constitutional provisions and statutes on eminent
domain with language more specific than the federal Takings Clause.
The specific language used in these three states either prohibited
eminent domain for private use or defined acceptable public uses.
In Georgia Department of Transportation v. Jasper County, the
county sought to condemn GDOT's property and lease it to a private
company that would construct and operate a marine terminal.2"5
Although the marine terminal looks like a railroad for public use
purposes, it differs in one significant aspect. While both the railroad
and the marine terminal are transfers of private property to a private
entity and both are gated facilities,20 6 the marine terminal lacks any
general right of public access because access is limited to those
steamship lines doing business with the company.20 7
Before the U.S. Supreme Court decided that economic
development qualifies as a public use under the federal Takings
202. Id. at 65-66.
203. These protections include the very first section of the first article declaring that man's
rights to acquire, possess, and protect property are inalienable rights. OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 1;
see also id. art. 1, § 19 ("Private property shall ever be held inviolate, but subservient to the
public welfare.").
204. See Homey at 68.
205. 586 S.E.2d 853, 854 (S.C. 2003).
206. Id. at 857; see supra note 24.
207. Ga. Dep 't of Transp., 586 S.E.2d at 857.
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Clause, the South Carolina Supreme Court decided Georgia
Department of Transportation. The South Carolina court held that
economic development does not qualify as a public use under the
South Carolina Takings Clause.2"8 Though the two constitutions
contain the same Takings Clause language, unlike the federal
Constitution, the South Carolina Takings Clause also expressly
prohibits takings for private use.2"9 The South Carolina court
explained that it limited the power of eminent domain to situations
where the taking involves the public or public agencies possessing,
occupying, and enjoying the taken property because eminent domain
interferes with the owner's right to acquire, possess, and defend his
property."'
After the U.S. Supreme Court decided Kelo, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court interpreted its statutory and constitutional law on
eminent domain and reached a conclusion similar to the Michigan
court's. An Oklahoma county urged the court to allow the taking of
private property for economic development, including increased
taxes, jobs, and public and private investment." In Board of County
Commissioners of Muskogee County v. Lowery, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court rejected the county's argument and decided that
economic development alone is not a public purpose justifying the
exercise of a county's power of eminent domain under Oklahoma's
statutory and constitutional eminent domain provisions." 2 In terms
of this Note's categories, the Oklahoma court allowed takings under
category four, but not under category five.213
In reaching its holding, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
considered its state constitutional provisions limiting eminent
domain, which the court described as limits on the government's
208. Id. at 856. South Carolina's Takings Clause states that "private property shall not be
taken for private use without the consent of the owner, nor for public use without just
compensation being first made therefor." S.C. CONST. art. I, § 13.
209. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V, with S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
210. Ga. Dep't of Transp., 586 S.E.2d at 856.
211. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Muskogee County v. Lowery, 2006 OK 31, 1 15, 136 P.3d
639, 649.
212. See id. 11, 13, 136 P.3d at 647.
213. See id. 11 n.11, 136 P.3d at 647 n. I1 (stating that no allegation existed that any of the
subject properties were blighted). The court noted that its Lowery decision did not disturb its
precedent holding takings appropriate for the combined purposes of blight removal and economic
development. Id.
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power, not grants of power. 1 4  The court explained that its
constitutional provisions placed a more stringent limit on
government's power of eminent domain than Kelo's interpretation of
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.215  The court
acknowledged, however, that the Oklahoma Constitution expressly
forbids the taking of private property for private use unlike the
federal Constitution. 6
As for the Oklahoma statutory provisions regarding eminent
domain, the court adhered to a strict construction, "mindful of the
critical importance of the protection of individual private property
rights as recognized by the framers of both the U.S. Constitution and
the Oklahoma Constitution. '217  In light of both the Oklahoma
Constitution and statutes, the Oklahoma court reasoned that
construing "public purpose"2 8 broad enough to include economic
development, as the U.S. Supreme Court has, abandons a limit on
government, eliminates any distinction between public and private
use, and deletes "public use" from the Constitution.219
Arizona citizens recently approved a ballot initiative in response
to Kelo that amends the state's statutory scheme covering eminent
domain by limiting public use. 2 Under the new law, Arizona allows
the government to exercise eminent domain only for a public use.2
Arizona defines public use to include: 1) a taking for the possession,
occupation, and enjoyment of the public or public agency, 2) a taking
for a public utility, 3) a taking to eliminate a direct threat of harm to
the public, or 4) a taking of abandoned property. 2  In terms of this
214. Id. 9-10, 136 P.3d at 645-46. The Oklahoma Constitution declares that "[n]o private
property shall be taken or damaged for private use, with or without compensation... except for
private ways of necessity ...." and [pirivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation." OKLA. CONST. art. II, §§ 23-24.
215. Lowery, 2006 OK31, 19, 136 P.3d at 651.
216. Id. 20, 136 P.3d at 652. Compare OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 23, with U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
217. Lowery, 2006 OK 31, 11, 136 P.3d at 647.
218. Oklahoma law uses the terms "public use" and "public purpose" interchangeably when
analyzing state constitutional eminent domain provisions. Id. 9, 136 P.3d at 646.
219. Id. 11, 136 P.3d at 647.
220. See Bruce Ramsey, Despite Losses, Property-Rights Fight Is Far from Over, SEATTLE
TIMEs, Nov. 15, 2006, at B6.
221. Private Property Rights Protection Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1131 (2007).
222. Id. § 12-1136(5) (defining public use).
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Note's categories, the Arizona statute will allow takings for
categories one through four, but not category five.
The constitutional and statutory language in these states
provides examples of ways to draft or modify eminent domain law so
that public use is more clearly defined.
VI. CONCLUSION
Public use as used in the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment can be divided into five categories, each progressively
less public. The first two categories are consistent with the actual-
use theory of public use, and demand that government take private
property only for government ownership or use by the general
public. The last two categories are applications of the public-benefit
theory, which allows a taking of private property for a public benefit
or a public purpose. The third category of railroad and public utility
cases is the connecting point for the two theories as these cases apply
the justifications of both theories.
In Kelo, the Court expanded public use so broadly that one
questions whether public use imposes any real limit on the
government's power of eminent domain. Future Courts should heed
the words of the Kelo dissents before public use is effectively deleted
from the Constitution. To the extent that the Court has already
ignored public use, future Courts ought to reassess their precedent in
light of the original import the Framers gave public use in designing
our delicate system. The Court need not play with words. Public use
should mean just that-use primarily by the public.
In addition to seeking a change of jurisprudence from the Court,
lobbying representative government, both federal and state, offers
other viable options to narrow the meaning of public use. South
Carolina, Oklahoma, and Arizona provide examples of constitutional
and statutory language that these states have adopted to protect
property rights. Each of these states define public use more
specifically and expressly forbid takings for private use. Defining
public use more specifically is a reasonable means to protect
property rights. It seems unnecessary, however, to adopt language
that expressly forbids a taking for private use because current
language that authorizes a taking allows only the taking for public
use. Nonetheless, language expressly prohibiting private use takings
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should be encouraged to curb abuse of property rights, regardless of
how unnecessary it may seem. It is necessary.
